We investigate the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic belief but heterogeneous risk attitudes. Of our two formulas regarding the representative consumer's risk attitude, the first one implies that if all consumers' relative risk aversions are decreasing, then so is the representative consumer's counterpart; and if, moreover, the former are unequal, then the latter is strictly decreasing. The second formula implies the analogous result on the convexity of absolute risk tolerance (the reciprocal of absolute risk aversion). We also provide a formula relating the curvature of an individual consumer's risk sharing rule to his cautiousness (the derivative of the absolute risk tolerance). We analyze the limits of the representative consumer's risk attitude and individual consumers' risk-sharing rules as the aggregate consumption levels are taken to the upper and lower bounds (which may be infinite and negative infinite). Refinements of these results for the case of linear risk tolerances, extensions to multi-period economies, and implications on asset pricing and portfolio insurance are also given.
Introduction
We consider an exchange economy under uncertainty with a single good and a single consumption period, in which all consumers hold common probability assessments over the state space and yet differing expected utility functions. Two things are well known for Pareto efficient allocations in such an economy. First, every consumer's consumption level is uniquely determined by the aggregate consumption level. Hence every consumer's state-contingent consumption levels can be specified as a function, called the risk sharing rule, of aggregate consumption levels. Second, there exists a representative consumer, in the sense that the support price of the single-consumer economy consisting solely of the representative consumer is also the support price for the Pareto efficient allocation of the original, multi-consumer economy. Hence, knowing the representative consumer's risk attitude is sufficient to price all assets in financial markets.
The benchmark result on this subject matter is the mutual fund theorem. Define absolute risk tolerance as the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, and call its first derivative absolute cautiousness. Then, hyperbolic absolute risk aversion, linear (or, to be more precise, affine) absolute risk tolerance, and constant absolute cautiousness are all equivalent properties of an expected utility function u, and mathematically boil down to the existence of a τ ∈ IR and a γ ∈ IR such that − u (x) u (x) = τ + γx for every x. In particular, this property is met if u exhibits constant absolute or relative risk aversion. The mutual fund theorem states that if all consumers have a constant, common absolute cautiousness γ, then the representative consumer also has the same constant absolute cautiousness γ and all individuals' risk-sharing rules are linear (affine). In this paper, we drop the assumption of a constant, common absolute cautiousness and analyze the implication of heterogeneous absolute cautiousness on the risk-sharing rules and the representative consumer's risk attitude. As can be inferred from existing results dispersed in the wide range of literature, the mutual fund theorem would not hold without the assumption. The contribution of this paper is, in short, to provide a detailed description of the way in which the representative consumer's absolute cautiousness is not constant and the risk-sharing rules are not linear in this environment. None of our results requires any distributional assumptions of aggregate endowments, and most of them do not require specific functional forms, such as log or power functions for expected utility functions.
We should stress that the investigation of the way in which the mutual fund theorem fails to hold is no less important than the theorem itself. Also, just like the theorem, we establish qualitative properties on the representative consumer's risk attitude and the risk-sharing rules, which are true regardless of the choice of Pareto efficient allocations, or, equivalently, of utility weights in the maximization problem characterizing the efficient allocations. If financial markets are complete, then the equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient, and this is equivalent to saying that the qualitative properties we establish are true for all specifications of initial wealth distributions.
In the rest of this introduction, we list our results and explain how they clarify, generalize, and refine the existing results.
Representative Consumer's Risk Attitude
We first establish results on the effect of heterogeneity of consumers' risk attitudes on the absolute cautiousness of the representative consumer. The formula of Theorem 5 expresses the derivative of the absolute cautiousness of the representative consumer as the sum of two components. The first one is a weighted sum of the derivatives of the individual consumers' absolute cautiousness, and the second is a positive multiple of the weighted variance of the absolute cautiousness across all individual consumers. A corollary to this theorem (Corollary 6) is that if every consumer exhibits convex risk tolerance (non-increasing cautiousness), then so does the representative consumer; and that any heterogeneity in absolute cautiousness leads to strictly convex risk tolerance. In Propositions 12 to 15, we show that the representative consumer's absolute cautiousness tends to the absolute cautiousness of the most absolutely cautious individual consumer in the economy as the aggregate consumption level tends to its upper bound (which may be finite or infinite); and that it tends to that of the least absolutely cautious individual consumer as the aggregate consumption level tends to its lower bound (which may be finite or negative infinite).
We then provide similar results for the representative consumer's relative risk aversion.
The terminology here is that the relative risk tolerance is the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, and the relative cautiousness is the derivative of the relative risk tolerance. The formula of Theorem 9 expresses the relative cautiousness of the representative consumer as the sum of two components. The first one is a weighted sum of the individual consumers' relative cautiousness, and the second is a positive multiple of a weighted variance of their relative risk tolerance. A corollary to this theorem (Corollary 11) is that if every individual consumer exhibits non-increasing relative risk aversion, then so does the representative consumer; and that any heterogeneity in relative risk aversion leads to strictly decreasing relative risk aversion. In Proposition 17, we show that the representative consumer's relative risk aversion tends to the relative risk aversion of the least risk averse individual consumer in the economy as the aggregate consumption level tends to infinity, and it tends to that of the most risk averse individual consumer as the aggregate consumption level tends to zero.
These results on the representative consumer's relative risk aversion generalize those obtained by Benninga and Mayshar (2000) , who assumed that all consumers have the same discount rate and constant but differing coefficients of relative risk aversion in a two-period economy, and by Wang (1998) , who considered a continuous-time economy with two consumers which have the same properties as assumed by Benninga and Mayshar (2000) . The fact that the individual consumers' heterogeneous risk attitudes give rise to decreasing relative risk aversion for the representative consumer can be seen in inequality (6.11) of Calvet, Grandmont, and Lemaire (1999) on the elasticity of the representative consumer's relative risk tolerance. We contend, however, that the formula of Theorem 9 is sharper, and hence potentially more applicable, than their inequality, as it is an equality for the derivative of the representative consumer's relative risk tolerance.
Our results indicate that the risk attitude of the representative consumer may well be qualitatively different from the risk attitude of any individual in the economy. In particular, even when every consumer exhibits constant relative risk aversion, it is not appropriate to model the representative consumer as some median individual consumer of the economy. Moreover, in a growing economy, the representative consumer's relative risk aversion converges to that of the least risk averse individual consumer. This observation is especially relevant to the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) , who found a very high coefficient of relative risk aversion when attempting to reconcile the U.S. empirical data with the representative consumer model with constant relative risk aversion.
Asset Pricing
We investigate the mis-pricing of derivative assets which occurs when a modeler erroneously assumes that the representative consumer exhibits constant relative risk aversion or linear absolute risk tolerance, while in fact the representative consumer exhibits strictly decreasing relative risk aversion or strictly convex absolute risk tolerance as a result of heterogeneity in the individual consumers' risk attitudes. We concentrate on derivative assets of the aggregate endowment of the economy, whose state-contingent payoffs are determined by the realization of the aggregate endowment. We investigate two types of affine approximations of the representative consumer's risk attitude.
The first approximation is such that the hypothetical representative consumer's absolute risk tolerance and cautiousness are matched to their actual values for some realized level of aggregate endowment. Proposition 24 states that this approximation of the representative consumer's risk tolerance underestimates the price, relative to the risk-free bond, of these derivative assets whose payoffs are increasing functions of the aggregate endowment, such as call options but not put options.
In the second approximation, the representative consumer exhibits constant relative risk aversion matched to the actual counterpart for some realized level of aggregate endowment and we further require that the price for the aggregate endowment, or, in the terminology of finance, the market portfolio, be correctly estimated in the approximation. The equity premium is then correctly predicted. This sort of approximation, without the requirement that the aggregate endowment be correctly priced, was considered by Benninga and Mayshar (2000) for the case where all consumers exhibit constant relative risk aversion and the aggregate endowment is log-normally distributed. The additional requirement for a correct pricing of the market portfolio was used by Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam (1999) , and it makes this second approximation better suited to test whether the Black-Scholes option pricing formula is still valid when the heterogenous consumers are explicitly incorporated into a model. Proposition 25, which is a simple generalization of a result by Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam (1999), states that under this approximation every convex derivative asset, such as call and put options are underpriced.
Risk-Sharing Rules
The crucial result (Proposition 4) builds on results of Wilson (1968) consumers' share of consumption as well as their marginal increment in consumption converge to one; and that as the aggregate consumption level tends to the lower bound, the same is true for the least absolutely cautious consumers. Hence the distribution of the individual consumers' consumption levels are more biased when the realization of the aggregate endowment is very large or very small than when it is of a modest value.
Much stronger results can be obtained when all individual consumers exhibit constant cautiousness, and the constants differ across them. We show (Theorem 21) that an individual consumer's risk-sharing rule can then be only of three types, depending on the individual's absolute cautiousness. Each least absolutely cautious consumer has an everywhere strictly concave risk-sharing rule. Each most absolutely cautious consumer has an everywhere strictly convex risk-sharing rule. Any of the other consumers has a risk-sharing rule that is initially convex up to a unique inflection point and concave thereafter. The inflection points, furthermore, are ordered according to the consumers' absolute cautiousness, the more absolutely cautious the consumer the lower the inflection point of his risk-sharing rule. This is illustrated in Figure 1 in Section 6. 1
The results for the most and least cautious consumer have been obtained by Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki (1981) , who considered the expected utility maximization problem of a consumer who chooses over state-contingent claims of a reference portfolio. Holding 1 We should also add that Kurosaki (2001) claimed that if all consumers exhibit constant relative risk aversion, then the logarithmic risk-sharing rule, which assigns the mean of the logs of the consumers' consumption levels to each individual consumer's consumption level, is linear with a slope proportional to his own relative risk tolerance.
the underlying asset and a put option is equivalent to holding cash and a call option of the same exercise price, often called the call-put parity, but these are also equivalent to having a portfolio insurance as well. In all of these cases, the generated return is a convex function of the values of the portfolio. They were thus led to identify conditions on the consumer's utility function for his optimal choice of return to be a convex function of the value of the portfolio. Among the differences between this work and theirs, the most important one is that they took the representative consumer's risk aversion as given, while we derive it as a result of efficient risk-sharing among heterogeneous consumers. In particular, the situation Leland aversion is allowed to decline, the result seems to lose some of its theoretical relevance because the risk-sharing rule is everywhere convex only for the most absolutely cautious consumers. 
Multiple Periods
and u i is smooth and satisfies
The uncertainty of the economy is described by a probability measure space (Ω, F, P ).
The probability measure P specifies the common (objective) belief on the likelihood of the states. Denote by E the expectation with respect to P . The aggregate endowment of the economy and each consumer's consumption are both random variables on the probability measure space.
For each consumer i, we define his consumption set
i is the set of random variables ζ i for which the expected utility E (u i (ζ i )) is finite. Note that since u i is strictly concave, Z * i is a convex set. Moreover, for every 
Furthermore, the assumption of a common probabilistic belief and expected utility allows the efficient allocations to be represented in terms of risk-sharing rules. 
) is a feasible consumption allocation for ζ.
, consider the following maximization problem:
By strict concavity for each x, there exists at most one solution to this problem, which we denote by f λ (x). In general, there may not be any solution for some values of x and λ, 
there exists a solution. This is proved in Appendix A. Then, for every λ, the mapping
I is well defined. We shall assume this throughout the paper. Since f λ is smooth by the implicit function theorem, it is a risk-sharing rule. It is
is a solution to the maximization problem (1) if and only if ζ * i = f λi (ζ) for every i. This argument establishes the following lemma, which can be traced back to Borch (1962, p. 428 ) and Wilson (1968) , and is nicely explained in Kreps (1990, Section 5.4) .
is an efficient allocation of ζ.
As pointed out earlier, if the aggregate endowment ζ is sufficiently far away from the lower
By virtue of this lemma, we say that a risk-sharing rule f is efficient if there exists a λ ∈ IR I ++ such that f = f λ . Let f be an efficient risk-sharing rule. Denote the maximum attained in the problem (2) , with the same λ as corresponds to f , by u(x). We are thereby defining a function u : d, d → IR, which is the value function of the problem. Since
if f λi (ζ) ∈ Z * i for every i, the function u can be interpreted as the von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function of the representative consumer corresponding to the efficient risk-sharing rule f . Note that the assumption of the common probabilistic belief is crucial for this interpretation of u. By the implicit function theorem, u is smooth. To contrast with the representative consumer, we sometimes refer to the I consumers as individual consumers.
The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion of consumer i is defined as
The reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion, 1/a i (x i ), is the absolute risk tolerance and denoted by t i (x i ). The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion of consumer i is defined, for
The reciprocal of the relative risk aversion, 1/b i (x i ), is the relative risk tolerance and denoted by s i (x i ). All of these are smooth functions.
Wilson (1968, page 129) referred to the first derivative of the absolute risk tolerance,
, as cautiousness, but we shall call it the absolute cautiousness, to distinguish it from the relative cautiousness, which is s i (x i ). According to this terminology, if two consumers exhibit constant but differing relative risk aversion, then they are equally relatively cautious but the one with the smaller relative risk aversion is more absolutely cautious. This might sound a bit confusing, but we follow the path paved by Wilson.
The absolute risk aversion a(x), absolute risk tolerance The following lemma is due to Wilson (1968, Theorems 4 and 5).
Lemma 2 (Wilson (1968)) Let f be an efficient risk-sharing rule and t be the representative consumer's absolute risk tolerance corresponding to f , then, for every i and x
There are a couple of implications of this lemma. First, by (3), f i (x) > 0, so that f i is strictly increasing for every x. This property is called comonotonicity. Second, both the absolute risk tolerance and absolute cautiousness are bounded by the individual consumers' counterpart via max max
An immediate corollary of inequality (7) is a sufficient condition for the monotonicity of t, and hence of a.
Corollary 3 1. If t i is non-decreasing for every i, then so is t.

If a i is non-increasing for every i, then so is a.
If t i is non-increasing for every i, then so is t.
If a i is non-decreasing for every i, then so is a.
Curvature of the Efficient Risk-Sharing Rules
Throughout this section, we let f : The following proposition is rich in interpretations.
Proposition 4 For every i and x
Proof of Proposition 4 By equality (3),
for every x ∈ d, d . Differentiating both sides with respect to x, we obtain
Rearranging this, we complete the proof.
The first implication of Proposition 4 is that for every The second, finer, implication of the proposition is that for every x ∈ d, d and all i and j,
To appreciate this, recall that the ratios of the first and second derivatives, such as
and f j (x)/f j (x), often appear in expected utility theory. They measure the curvatures of the individual risk-sharing rules f i and f j . For example,
x if and only if f i is a convex function of f j . The above implication then means that the degree of convexity of f i is positively related to absolute cautiousness. That is, the marginal consumption that consumer i receives as the aggregate endowment increases grows at a rate higher than its counterpart for consumer j if consumer i is more absolutely cautious than consumer j. What this means in the context of portfolio insurance is that consumer i purchases more portfolio insurance (or options) relative to the size of the reference portfolio he holds than consumer j does. Although both Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki (1981) were concerned with the second derivatives f i (x) and f j (x), rather than the ratios f i (x)/f i (x) and
, we believe that the latter is a better notion of convexity, as it allows comparisons of convexity which are unaffected by linear transformations of the risk-sharing rules. Our result also provides a complete ordering of all consumers' curvatures according to consumers' absolute cautiousness. In particular, it shows that the levels of risk tolerance do not matter for the curvatures of the risk-sharing rules, although they do matter for the slopes. 2 This is an important point, especially in the analysis of the background risk, which was a topic included 2 We thank Christian Gollier for clarifying this point.
in earlier version of this paper but is to be dealt with in a separate paper in preparation. 3 
Representative Consumer's Risk Attitudes
Throughout this section, we let f be an efficient risk-sharing rule and denote by a, t, b, and s the representative consumer's absolute risk aversion, absolute risk tolerance, relative risk aversion, and relative risk tolerance, corresponding to f .
Absolute Cautiousness
We show that if every consumer exhibits non-decreasing absolute cautiousness, then so does the representative consumer. Moreover, even the slightest heterogeneity in their absolute cautiousness would cause the representative consumer's counterpart to be strictly increasing.
The following formula establishes these conclusions.
Recall that, by equality (5), the mean of the individual consumers' absolute cautiousness
) with respect to the probability mass function f i (x) equals the representative consumer's cautiousness t (x). The sum of the second term on the right hand side of (11) is thus the variance of the t i (f i (x)) with respect to the same probability mass function. It represents the contribution of heterogeneity in absolute cautiousness to the derivative of the representative consumer's absolute cautiousness.
Proof of Theorem 5 Differentiate both sides of equality (5), then we obtain
By f i (x) = 0 and equality (10),
Plug this result into equality (12), then we obtain (11).
The following is an immediate but important consequence of Theorem 5.
there exists a consumer i such that t i (f i (x)) > 0 or there exist two consumers i and j such
Another corollary, in terms of the absolute risk tolerance, is:
Corollary 7 If t i is a convex function for every i, then so is t. If, moreover, the individual consumers' absolute cautiousness are not completely equal at any aggregate consumption level (that is, for every x ∈ d, d , there exist two consumers i and j such that
Formula (11) suggests that even if all consumers exhibit concave, rather than convex, risk tolerance, the representative consumer may exhibit convex risk tolerance. We can therefore say that the aggregation over heterogeneous consumers tends to induce the representative consumer to exhibit convex risk tolerance.
An implication of convex absolute risk tolerance for the representative consumer is given by , who showed that if all consumers have the same utility function, then wealth inequality (which would correspond to the biases in the utility weights λ i in our maximization problem (2)) increases the equilibrium price of the aggregate endowment ζ if and only if the absolute risk tolerance (of every consumer in this case) is convex. The effect of wealth inequality in a model of consumers with heterogeneous risk attitudes is, however, yet to be explored.
We now touch briefly on the relationship to empirical findings. Based on recent data on Italian households, Guiso and Paiella (2000) found that individual consumers exhibit concave risk tolerance and that there is some heterogeneity in their risk attitudes. Hence, by Theorem 5, the representative consumer may well exhibit convex absolute risk tolerance. Now suppose that this is indeed the case, and yet we erroneously assumed that the economy were to consists of individual consumers having the same risk attitude as the representative consumer.
We would then conclude that individual consumers exhibit convex absolute risk tolerance, which has a few testable implications. One is that, according to Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) , younger individual consumers invest more in risky assets than wealth-equivalent older counterparts, but this contradicts the empirical findings of, for example, Guiso, Jappelli, and
Terlizzese (1996) . While this contradiction would constitute a puzzle under the erroneous assumption, it does not do so if the heterogeneity in absolute cautiousness and their convexifying effect are taken into consideration, as exemplified by formula (11).
Relative Risk Tolerance and Relative Risk Aversion
We prove a formula similar to (11) to show that if every consumer exhibits non-increasing relative risk aversion, so does the representative consumer, and that if there is any heterogeneity in individual consumers' relative risk aversion, then his relative risk aversion is strictly decreasing. While the method of proof is similar to that of (11) 
This is the elasticity of consumer i's consumption level with respect to the aggregate consumption. The following proposition presents a preliminary result.
If
Equality (16) 
Proof of Proposition 8
By multiplying x to both sides of equality (3), we obtain
This is nothing but equality (13) . Equality (14) is then straightforward. Multiply f i (x)/x to both sides of this equality, then
Summing both sides over i and using f i (x)/x = 1, we obtain equality (15) . By equality (4),
By dividing both sides by x, we prove (16).
Theorem 9 For every
Recall that, by equality (16), the mean of the individual consumers' relative risk tolerance
) with respect to the probability mass function f i (x)/x equals the representative consumer's relative risk tolerance s(x). The sum in the second term on the right hand side of (11) is thus the variance of the s i (f i (x)) with respect to the same probability mass function. It represents the contribution of heterogeneity in relative risk tolerance to the relative cautiousness.
The proof of the formula (17) follows that of inequality (6.11) of Calvet, Gradmont, and
Lemaire (1999). Unlike their formula, however, our formula is an equality rather than an inequality, and does not involve the elasticity of relative risk tolerance.
Proof of Theorem 9 By equality (16),
By equality (5),
Thus,
By equality (13) ,
, and hence
The following is an immediate but important consequence of Theorem 9.
Corollary 10 Let x ∈ d, d and assume that f i (x) > 0 for every i. The second corollary of Theorem 9 contains no more information than Corollary 10, but it is easier to quote as it does not explicitly refer to relative cautiousness and constitute a nice contrast with Corollary 7.
If s
i (f i (x)) ≥ 0 for every i, then s (x) ≥ 0. If,i (f i (x)) = s j (f j (x)), then s (x) > 0. 2. If b i (f i (x)) ≤ 0 for every i, then b (x) ≤ 0. If,
Corollary 11
Assume that d i ≥ 0 for every i. 
If s i is a non-decreasing function for every
The most important implication of Corollary 11 is that if the representative consumer is interpreted as representing the entire economy of heterogeneous consumers rather than it literally is a single consumer, then the assumption that he has a constant relative risk aversion is implausible, as it is not compatible even with a slight heterogeneity in the individual consumers. This point is particularly relevant to the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) . They showed that the classical, representative consumer model cannot explain the large expected equity premium observed in the U.S. stock market during the last one hundred years unless the representative consumer is unreasonably risk-averse. There has since been a large body of literature, as surveyed, for example, by Kocherlakota (1996) , that attempts to explain the large premium by introducing non-expected utility functions; transaction costs; incomplete financial markets; and other types of market imperfections. 4 On a less methodological side, decreasing relative risk aversion implies the narrowing equity premium in a growing economy, and it is perhaps worthwhile to check the empirical validity of this property. 5 Another important implication of decreasing relative risk aversion is due to Gollier (2002) , who showed, among other things, that in a growing dynamic economy under uncertainty, 6 if the representative consumer exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion, then the socially optimal discount rate for project evaluation is a decreasing function of time span.
Limit Behavior
In this section, we investigate the limit behavior of the representative consumer's absolute cautiousness, relative risk tolerance (and hence relative risk aversion), and the risk-sharing rules. Roughly speaking, we show that the representative consumer's absolute cautiousness tends to the limit of the most absolutely cautious consumers' counterpart as the aggregate consumption level tends to its upper bound d (which may be infinite); and these consumers'
share of both the consumption levels, out of the aggregate consumption level, and of marginal consumptions, converges to one. This result is particularly relevant in the analysis of a dynamic growing economy. We also provide an analogous result when the aggregate consumption level tends to its lower bound d (which may be negative infinite), but the dominant consumers are then the least absolutely cautious ones. We also make statements of the limit behavior of 4 Incorporating decreasing relative risk aversion might indeed deepen the puzzle. We have heard this sort of argument at Kazuya Kamiya's presentation at Kobe University. 5 This is a suggestion by Kazunori Araki. 6 While the present analysis assumes that there is only one consumption period, we see in Section 8 that it
can be extended to a dynamic model. the representative consumer's relative risk tolerance (and hence relative risk aversion).
As a convention of this paper, we allow lim sup, lim inf, and lim to be ∞ or −∞. The max and min may be ∞ or −∞ accordingly.
Absolute Cautiousness and Risk-Sharing Rules
Define I to be the set of consumers i for whom d i = ∞ and there is no other consumer j such that d j = ∞ and lim sup
Since there are only finitely many consumers, if d i = ∞ for some i, then I = ∅. The consumers in I are those who are not unambiguously less absolutely cautious than any other when the consumption levels are very large. If lim
t j (x j ) exists for every j, then I consists of those consumers i such that lim
The first proposition of this section states that these consumers' share in the aggregate consumption level, as well as in the marginal consumptions, converges to one as the aggregate consumption level diverges to infinity, and that the representative consumer's absolute cautiousness eventually lies between the minimum and maximum of these consumers' absolute cautiousness. 
Proposition 12 If
d i = ∞ for some i, then i∈I f i (x)/x → 1 and i∈I f i (x) → 1 as x → ∞, and min i∈I lim inf x i →∞ t i (x i ) ≤ lim inf x→∞ t (x) ≤ lim sup x→∞ t (x) ≤ max i∈I lim sup x i →∞ t i (x i ) .
If, moreover, lim
Since there are only finitely many consumers, if
i, then I = ∅. Consumers in I have the following two characteristics. First, their absolute risk tolerance converges to zero as the consumption levels converge to the lower bound d i . Second, for consumption levels very close to the lower bounds, they are not unambiguously more absolutely cautious than any other consumer whose absolute risk tolerance also converges to zero as the consumption levels converge to the lower bounds. If
and lim
x j →∞ t j (x j ) exists for every j, then I consists of those consumers i such that
The following proposition states that, if the zero convergence assumption on the absolute risk tolerance holds for every consumer, then the following is true: The share of extra consumption in excess of the lower bound which is consumed by the individual consumers in I converges to one as the aggregate consumption level converges to the lower bound. Also the representative consumer's absolute cautiousness eventually lies between the minimum and maximum of these consumers' absolute cautiousness.
Proposition 13 If, for every consumer j, d j > −∞ and t
If, moreover, lim Define H to be the set of the consumers i for whom
there is no other consumer j such that d j < ∞, t j (x j ) → 0 as x j → d j , and lim sup
If, moreover, lim Define H to be the set of the consumers i for whom d i = −∞ and there is no other consumer j such that d j = −∞ and lim sup
If, moreover, lim 
Relative Risk Tolerance and Relative Risk Aversion
The key observation for the analysis of the limit behavior of the representative consumer's relative risk tolerance and relative risk aversion is that under suitable assumptions, lim
and lim
This allows us to apply Proposition 12 and 13 to the relative risk aversion. The assumption we need for this argument is the following.
Assumption 16 For every consumer i, d
This assumption can be satisfied by utility functions exhibiting constant relative risk aversion. s i (x i ).
It implies that t i is a strictly positive, non-decreasing function. Thus
As for the limit as x → 0, note that as x → 0, f i (x) → 0 and hence t i (f i (x)) → 0. Thus
This shows that L'Hôpital's rule is applicable and the rest of the argument is as before.
This follows from part 1 and the definition of b and s.
Now define J as the set of the consumers i such that lim
every j, which is equivalent to lim
J as the set of the consumer j such that lim
s j (x j ), which is equivalent to
b j (x j ) for every j. We have already seen that J = I and J = I under Assumption 16. Propositions 12 and 13 thus implies the following:
Proposition 18 Under Assumption 16,
Linear Absolute Risk Tolerance
Combining the preceding results and assuming that all consumers' utility functions exhibit linear absolute risk tolerance, we show in this section that an individual consumer's risksharing rule is either everywhere concave, everywhere convex, or has a unique inflection point below which it is convex and above which it is concave.
Mathematically, a utility function u i : d i , d i → IR exhibits linear absolute risk tolerance
if, for the corresponding absolute risk tolerance t i , there exist two numbers τ i and γ i such that
for every x i ∈ d i , d i . This is equivalent to the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion a i (
and constant absolute cautiousness t i (x i ) = γ i .
Note that the right hand side of equality (21) As in the previous sections, let f : The first result of this section is concerned with the representative consumer's absolute risk tolerance.
Proof of Proposition 20
The first part of this proposition follows from Theorem 6. The second part follows from Proposition 12 or 14, depending on whether γ ≥ 0 or not. The third part follows from Proposition 13 or 15, depending on whether γ ≤ 0 or not.
The main result of this section is the following classification of risk-sharing rules.
Theorem 21
Assume that γ > γ. 
For every i / ∈ I ∪ I, there exists a unique y
i ∈ d i , d i such that f i (x) > 0 for every x < y i and f i (x) < 0 for every x > y i .
For the y i defined as in part 3,
y i < y j if γ i < γ j ; y i = y j if γ i = γ j ; and y i > y j if γ i > γ j .
Proof of Theorem 21
implies that y i has the property of part 3. Part 4 also follows from this property of y i and the fact that t is strictly increasing.
The next proposition is concerned with the total proportion of consumption levels consumed by those consumers with the largest or smallest absolute cautiousness. They immediately follow from Propositions 12 to 15. We thus omit the proof.
Proposition 22
In the rest of this section, we further assume that d i = 0, τ i = 0, and γ i > 0 for every i.
Then b i (x i ) = 1/γ i and hence u i exhibits constant relative risk aversion 1/γ i . The following result is a straightforward application of Propositions 10 and 17. We thus omit the proof.
Proposition 23
Assume that d i = 0, τ i = 0, and γ i > 0 for every i, and that γ > γ.
Theorem 21 is illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows the risk-sharing rules in a four-consumer 
Asset Pricing
This section provides a discussion of the implications of aggregation on derivative asset pricing and the equity premium. In particular we analyze the extent of mis-pricing of derivative assets if the modeler ignores the effects of aggregation as exemplified by Theorems 5 and 9.
Mathematically, by a derivative asset, we mean a derivative asset of the random aggregate endowment ζ, which promises to pay some amounts of the good contingent on the realization of ζ. It can therefore be characterized by a Lebesgue measurable function ϕ : d, d → IR, so that the derivative asset pays ϕ(ζ). Throughout this section, we of course assume that ζ is indeed random, so that its distribution is not concentrated on any single value.
As is well known, any positive multiple of the marginal utility u (ζ) of the representative consumer is a state price deflator (also known as the state price density and as the pricing kernel) that may support the efficient allocation f (ζ) as an equilibrium. Since
for every x and y, the random variable exp − ζ y a(z) dz is a state price deflator. If it is integrable, define
Then the relative price of the derivative asset ϕ(ζ) with respect to the risk-free bond equals E (πϕ(ζ)). Since π > 0 and E(π) = 1, π has the property of a density function.
Approximation by Linear Absolute Risk Tolerance
Using Theorem 5, we first analyze how derivative assets are mis-priced when the risk tolerance t is approximated by a linear one. This is similar to but different from the approximation considered by Benninga and Mayshar (2000) . Specifically, for any choice of y ∈ d, d , if we
, then t is the best linear approximation of t at y. The corresponding utility function then generates the actual absolute risk tolerance (and hence the actual absolute risk aversion) and the actual absolute cautiousness at an aggregate consumption level y but not necessarily at other levels. Let π be as in (22) and define
This would be the state-price deflator if the representative consumer's absolute risk tolerance were t. The following proposition states that this linear approximation π underestimates the price of every derivative asset ϕ(ζ) whenever ϕ is an increasing function and the individual consumers exhibit convex absolute risk tolerance and heterogenous absolute cautiousness.
Proposition 24 Suppose that t i is convex for every i and that for every x ∈ d, d , there exist two consumers i and j such that
non-constant and non-decreasing on the support of the induced probability measure
This proposition provides a sufficient condition for the estimate of the price of the derivative asset using t to be strictly less than its true price. The derivative asset ϕ(ζ) can be a call option or indeed the aggregate endowment ζ itself. Since a put option is non-increasing and non-constant, the proposition implies that its price is overestimated by t.
Proof of Proposition 24 By Corollary 7, t is strictly convex and hence t(x) < t(x)
for every x = y. Note that
Thus π/ π is a strictly increasing function of ζ. Hence the distribution of ζ with respect to the probability measure whose Radon-Nikodym derivative is π first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of ζ with respect to the probability measure whose Radon-Nikodym derivative is π. Then the strict inequality (24) follows from the assumption that ϕ is non-constant and non-decreasing.
Approximation by Constant Relative Risk Aversion
We now give an implication of Theorem 10 for derivative asset pricing. Our exercise here differs from Proposition 24 in that we approximate the representative consumer's utility function by a utility function exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, and that we further require the estimated price of the aggregate endowment, or the market portfolio, ζ, to equal the actual one. This requirement means that the equity premium 1/E(πζ)−1 is also correctly estimated.
It also makes this approximation better suited than the previous one to identify the bias of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula in the heterogeneous economy, as the formula is a function assigning the presumably correct prices of the underlying asset (which is the aggregate endowment in this case) to option prices. Benninga and Mayshar (2000) consider the same approximation without the requirement of correctly pricing aggregate endowment. Our result, Proposition 25, is a slight generalization of a result of Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam (1999).
In the rest of this subsection, we assume that d i = 0 for every i and d i = ∞ for some i. We define π as in equality (22) and π as in equality (23) for t defined by t(
where y > 0 is chosen so that E(πζ) = E( πζ). That is, we approximate t by taking the representative consumer's relative risk aversion constant at its actual value at the consumption level y, which was chosen to correctly estimate the actual price of the aggregate endowment.
His actual relative risk aversion at other consumption levels would, however, differ from its approximation.
Proposition 25 Suppose that b i is non-increasing for every i and that for every x > 0,
there exist two consumers i and j such that
. If a derivative asset ϕ : IR ++ → IR is convex and non-linear on the support of the induced probability measure
The proof is really the same as Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam's (1999) proof of their Theorem 1, which states, unlike Proposition 24, that both call and put options are underestimated by the approximation. Their proof generalizes easily to all convex derivative assets. The proof is given below for completeness.
Proof of Proposition 25
We shall first prove that the function
dz (27) defined on IR ++ has the following properties:
1. It is strictly decreasing on the interval (0, y);
2. It is strictly increasing on the interval (y, ∞);
3. It diverges to infinity as x → 0;
4. It diverges to infinity as x → ∞.
Since b is strictly decreasing by part 2 of Corollary 11, this is positive or negative according to whether z − y is positive or negative. This proves 2. By noting that
for every x < y, we can see that 1 follows as well. To prove 3, let y ∈ (0, y), then, for every
As x → 0, the first term remains non-negative; the second term diverges to infinity; and the third term remains constant. This proves 3. We can prove 4 by taking y > y and noting that
for every x > 0, and π * analogously. Then, π = π * (ζ) and π = π * (ζ). By the above result, the function
where
, is strictly decreasing on (0, y), strictly increasing on (y, ∞), equals k at x = y, and diverges to infinity as x → 0 or x → ∞. Hence, in particular, π * (y) = k π * (y) and π * (x) > k π * (x)
for every x = y. Thus E(π * (ζ)) > kE ( π * (ζ)), which implies that k < 1 because E(π * (ζ)) =
Since the function (28) is continuous, there exist exactly two points, x and x, such that
Now let ψ : IR → IR be the affine function such that ψ(x) = ϕ(x) and ψ(x) = ϕ(x). Since
E(π) = E( π) and E(πζ) = E( πζ)
, to complete the proof, it suffices to show that
Indeed,
by the change-of-variable formula. Since ϕ is convex,
with a strict inequality for some x. By this and (29), (30) sharper results in those papers.
As formulated in Section 2, the uncertainty of the economy is described by a probability measure space (Ω, F, P ). We now introduce the time span T , a subset of the non-negative half line IR + , which represents the timings at which consumption can take place. We shall 
is defined in terms of the binary relation i defined in the preceding paragraph in the same manner as in Section 2. The characterization of an efficient allocation in terms of the maximization problem and a sufficient condition for η i ∈ Y * i stated in that section remain true in the current context, with appropriate modifications.
Our assertion that a multi-period model can be reduced to a single-period model hinges on the following lemma. It draws heavily on Section 1.5 of Chung (1980).
Lemma 26
There exists a σ-field F * on T × Ω and a probability measure P * on F * such that: 
The space L of all progressively measurable functions coincides with the space of all
where E * is the expectation with respect to P * .
The underlying idea of this lemma is to treat the time span T as if it were another state space. The first part of the lemma says that the set of all progressively measurable processes can be identified with the set of all measurable functions once we introduce an appropriate σ-field F * on the product of two state spaces T and Ω. Its second part claims that, once an appropriate probability measure P * is introduced on the new σ-field F * , the integrability is preserved under these probability measures. It also shows that the integral under one probability measure is always a constant multiple of the other; and hence, by putting η = u i (η i ), which is the utility process of consumer i from the consumption process η i , we can see that the expected utility ordering over consumption paths is identical between the two. As can be seen clearly in the proof, the discrete case poses no difficulty; indeed, it has been known and mentioned in . The only difficulty arises in the continuous-time case, since it is necessary to induce an appropriate σ-field on the new product space. To define another probability measure P * on T ×Ω, note first that, according to Section 1. It is easy to show that P * is σ-additive and satisfies P * (T × Ω) = rr −1 = 1. Hence P * is a probability measure on F * . It remains to prove equality (31). But, by the definition of P * , it is true for every simple function of F * . Hence, by continuity of the integral, it is true for every P * -integrable η.
Proof of Lemma 26
By this lemma, the time-separable, time-homogeneous intertemporal expected utility function E ∞ 0 exp(−rt)u i η t i dt on Y i can be identified with the expected utility function E * (u i (η i )) on a single consumption period with σ-field F * and probability measure P * . Since Lemma 1 is applicable to the probability measure space (T × Ω, F * , P * ), the efficient allocations of the multi-period models can be expressed by means of the same risk-sharing rules as defined in Section 2, which is now regarded as time-separable and time-homogeneous. This implies that the representative consumer has a time-separable, time-homogeneous intertemporal expected utility function with the same discount rate r, and all the results in the preceding sections apply to the multi-period models with appropriate modifications. Some of its economic interpretations, however, need some care. For example, a risk-free asset in the new probability space (T × Ω, F * , P * ) would be the perpetual bond, which pays one unit under any circumstance at any point in time, rather than just at a point in time. As another example, the mutual fund theorem in (T × Ω, F * , P * ) would also imply that the intertemporal sharing rule is linear.
Conclusion
We have presented detailed properties of the efficient risk-sharing rules and the representative consumer's risk attitude in an economy under uncertainty where individual consumers have a homogeneous probabilistic belief over the state space but heterogeneous risk attitudes. In particular, we showed that heterogeneity in the consumers' absolute cautiousness, which is the derivative of the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, is a key factor for the curvature of the risk-sharing rules. We also showed that the heterogeneity in the individual consumers' risk attitudes has a convexifying effect on the representative consumer's absolute risk tolerance and a decreasing effect on his relative risk aversion.
Although our results are mostly theoretical and qualitative, they have strong coherence with empirical findings. For example, Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000) found from option prices that the representative consumer exhibits strictly decreasing relative risk aversion. The result by Ogaki and Zhang (2001) highlights the importance of identifying the qualitative properties of the efficient risk-sharing rules for a wide class of utility functions: Using a three-year data set on the food consumption in rural villages in India and Pakistan and an efficiency condition equivalent to our equality (13) , they showed that the hypothesis that the intravillage risk-sharing is efficient is rejected if the utility functions are constrained to exhibit constant relative risk aversion, but not if they are allowed to exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion, albeit retaining linear absolute risk tolerance. To estimate how large the consumers' risk aversions are and test whether the equilibrium allocation is efficient in a heterogeneous group of consumers, our results will serve as a useful theoretical foundation. Exploration of such empirical facts should be an interesting direction of future research. 7 A Existence of a Solution to the Maximization Problem (2) In this appendix, we prove that for every λ and x, there exists a solution to the maximization problem (2) , that is, 
B Proof of Propositions 12 and 13
To prove Propositions 12 and 13, we need two lemmas. The first one is concerned with the ratio of two individual consumers' risk-sharing rules and their derivatives. The weights λ i in the maximization problem (2) are all set equal to one.
